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Abstract
Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject
to debate. One psychological feature likely to be relevant is the formation of
expectations, particularly about receiving cooperative or generous behavior
from others. Without such expectations, social life will be seriously impeded
and, in turn, expectations leading to satisfactory interactions can become
norms and institutionalize cooperation. In this paper, we assess people’s
expectations of generosity in a series of controlled experiments using the dic-
tator game. Despite differences in respective roles, involvement in the game,
degree of social distance or variation of stakes, the results are conclusive:
subjects seldom predict that dictators will behave selfishly (by choosing the
Nash equilibrium action, namely giving nothing). The majority of subjects
expect that dictators will choose the equal split. This implies that generous
behavior is not only observed in the lab, but also expected by subjects. In
addition, expectations are accurate, matching closely the donations observed
and showing that as a society we have a good grasp of how we interact.
Finally, correlation between expectations and actual behavior suggests that
expectations can be an important ingredient of generous or cooperative be-
havior.
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experimental evidence
1. Introduction1
Humans are one of the four pinnacles of social evolution along with colo-2
nial invertebrates, social insects and nonhuman mammals [1, 2]. Recent3
research points to psychological mechanisms, evolved to support our ultra-4
cooperative lifestyle, as the basis for human ultra-sociality [3, 4]. Prominent5
among such mechanisms is that interaction with others sets up expectations.6
Indeed, when facing others in a social context, we do not suppose that they7
will behave randomly, but rather we believe their actions will conform to our8
expectations for that context. In particular, expectations are deeply inter-9
twined with cooperative and generous behavior: Thus, we expect dedication10
and care (beyond the pure delivery of services), for instance, when we visit11
the doctor or when we ask for advice in a shop. Crucially, this is also true of12
people whom we meet for the first time: without this sort of wishful thinking,13
we would probably not travel abroad, since there is always a risk of getting14
sick or needing help in different ways among strangers. Expectations, in turn,15
grease the wheels of social integration, affecting not only our behavior and16
the emergence of social norms [5, 6] but also our level of happiness [7, 8, 9].17
Not surprinsingly, expectations have been taken as a reference point in many18
behavioral models[10, 11, 12, 13, 14].19
Expectations are also very important in many economic environments.20
They are, e.g., associated with herding behavior [15], decisions to trust in21
the investment game [16], strategic thinking [17, 18, 19], cooperation in so-22
cial dilemmas[20, 21], ultimatum bargaining [22] and many others. At the23
organizational level, employees’ expectations might affect their decisions on24
giving up their current job or accepting a particular offer, as expectations25
about peers’ performance influence their level of effort [23]. Expectations26
are indeed a well rooted concept in the setting of incomplete contracts, i.e.,27
contracts that for several reasons fail to specify investment levels properly,28
or other contingencies. These type of relations can only work if the parties29
trust in the other’s performance [24]. On the other hand, a related question30
is the accuracy of expectations and whether or not we can rely on them to31
make many decisions that arise on a daily basis both in social and in eco-32
nomic contexts. However, in spite of the importance of these issues, little is33
known about people’s expectations of being treated generously and how such34
expectations relate to actual generous behavior.35
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In this paper we aim to answering the above questions by means of a36
comprehensive exploration of subjects’ expectations about generosity. An37
appropriate manner to study expectations in generosity is the dictator game38
(DG for short), which has provided a large body experimental evidence on39
altruistic behaviour in the lab during the last thirty years [25, 26]. The DG40
is a simple one-shot game with two players: the first one (the dictator) is41
invited to divide a specified amount between himself and the second player42
(the recipient). The dictator may divide the pie in the manner he sees fit,43
while the recipient is not permitted to make any claim to the money. The-44
oretically, self-centered preferences predict that the dictator keeps all the45
pie and the recipient receives nothing; hence, any positive donation can be46
interpreted as proof of generosity. Contrary to the self-centered prediction,47
Engel’s meta-analysis [25] shows that a huge number of individuals do offer48
nonzero, often sizeable portions of the pie to the recipient. On average, sub-49
jects donate between 20-30% of the total pie with a non-trivial fraction of50
subjects choosing an equal split. Interestingly, some authors argue that this51
is indeed a lower bound for generosity given the absence of social context52
within a lab experiment [29, 27, 28, 30, 26, 31].53
Our specific goal here is to study if subjects expect this generous behav-54
ior in one-shot interactions, i.e., excluding any possible reciprocity effects55
[32, 33]. A detailed study of the DG implies the analysis of players expecta-56
tions in the game. Previous papers have focused on the relationship between57
the dictator’s expectations and his own behavior [34, 35, 36] or the role of58
gender in expectations [37]. In order to provide a truly general insight on59
expectations of generosity, it is important to study as many relevant factors60
as possible. Towards this goal, we have designed and carried out a set of61
experiments in which subjects have to guess the donation that a dictator62
has already given in a DG. We cover a wide range of conditions by varying63
the degree of involvement, the social distance, the role of the guesser, the64
possibility of hedging, the size of the stake or the location of the experi-65
ment. Although these elements have been found to affect donations in a DG66
[25, 26, 30, 31, 38, 27, 28, 29], there is yet no systematic investigation of how67
they could possibly influence expectations about generosity.68
Our research questions and their corresponding experimental conditions69
are summarized in Table 1 (a full description of the corresponding experi-70
mental setups is provided in the following section). In a nutshell, we elicit71
subjects’ expectations about the donation they expect from dictators tak-72
ing part in the same experiment (implying self-interest in the outcome) with73
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the usual or higher stakes, the donations others are going to receive (lack74
of involvement in the outcome), and the donations from absent dictators or75
from dictators from a previous experiment (thus probing the effects of so-76
cial distance between subjects). All choices are incentivized (subjects receive77
monetary payments according to the accuracy of their predictions). To avoid78
hedging, we consider a condition in which external observers do not receive79
the dictator’s donation, but are paid a fixed amount and their guesses [39].80
Finally, we also asked dictators to guess the donations of other dictators, and81
hence there is possible influence of one’s own choice in the answer.82
2. Materials and Methods83
This section explains the different treatments used along this research, the84
questions the study set out to answer in every treatment and the experimental85
procedures followed in each stage. An English translation of the instructions86
used in the experiments are included in the Supplementary Material. The87
data comes from 205 subjects who made a total of 255 (incentivized) guesses88
about the dictator’s donation (note that 50 subjects made two guesses as89
they participated in conditions 1 and 2).90
2.1. Conditions 1–2. Recipients in the lab guessing own and others’ dona-91
tions.92
A total of 100 subjects, all of them undergraduate students from fields93
other than Economics and Business, reporting no previous experience in ex-94
periments, participated in an experiment at the Laboratory for Research95
in Experimental Economics (LINEEX), University of Valencia, in February96
2013. The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software [53]. Sub-97
jects were randomly assigned to the role of dictator or recipient. Following98
standard instructions, dictators were asked to make a division of the pie (1099
Euros) in integer numbers. The instructions (read aloud by the instructor)100
made subjects aware that keeping the whole pie was acceptable. Once the101
dictators had reached their decision, the recipients (n1 = 50) were privately102
asked to guess the donation they were going to receive. A scoring rule with103
monetary incentives motivated recipients to make accurate guesses: Subjects104
were paid 5 Euros for correct answers, 1 Euro if they failed by just one unit,105
and 0 otherwise. Guessing what one is going to receive constitutes Condi-106
tion 1. Subjects were also asked to guess the behavior of another randomly107
selected dictator in the room (n2 = 50, Condition 2). The same scoring rule108
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was used to incentivize beliefs. Order effects were controlled for (i.e., half109
of them first made the guesses for their own dictators). No order effect was110
found; the distribution of guesses of those recipients who estimated the do-111
nation of their dictator first is not different from those who estimated other112
dictators first (Mann-Whitney U or the t-test, p-values > 0.183). At the113
end one of the beliefs (Condition 1 or 2) randomly selected was paid out.114
Recipients received this amount in addition to the donation of their matched115
dictator (see final remarks). All participants received a show-up fee of 2116
Euros. Subjects earned on average 8 Euros for the 30 minute session.117
2.2. Condition 3: Recipients in the field guessing own donations.118
This experiment was run at the Universidad Autonoma de Baja California119
Sur (UABCS) at La Paz (Mexico) in 2006. This location was chosen for120
two main reasons. First, to the best of our knowledge, no one had ever121
run any experiments at that location; therefore the whole population was122
completely inexperienced. Second, there was an interest in exploring the123
effect of ”high stakes” on expected generosity. Thus, the size of the surplus124
to be divided (200 pesos ≈ 15 US$, ≈ 14 Euros in 2006) was enough to125
buy 25 beers at any canteen there at La Paz. This would have cost more126
than $50 in the US in 2006 (this amount more than triples the standard127
pie of $10 in the DG). A total of 56 students were recruited the week prior128
to the experiment. On the day of the experiment, subjects waited in the129
central plaza of the school near the auditorium. Twenty-eight subjects were130
randomly selected as dictators (n3 = 28), while the remaining subjects were131
asked to wait for 15 minutes. Dictators received a package comprising a large132
brown envelope with another smaller white envelope inside, containing ten133
20-mexican peso bills (200 pesos) and experimental instructions. Instructions134
stated that the money they wished to keep should be placed within the135
small white envelope and then in their pockets. The money they wished to136
donate to the recipients waiting outside had to remain in the big envelope.137
When recipients were asked to come in, dictators left by the back door,138
making communication among them impossible. Each recipient was seated 2139
meters away from the place where their particular dictator had been seated140
and left the big envelope. Recipients received the instructions that their141
corresponding dictators had left. It was explained that these instructions142
belonged to the previous participants and then read them aloud. Recipients143
were informed that they would definitely receive the money in the envelope.144
They could earn 80 additional pesos if they guessed correctly the number of145
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bills in the envelope, 20 pesos if they failed by just one unit, and 0 additional146
pesos otherwise. Average earnings were 150 pesos (≈ 12 US$, ≈ 10 Euros)147
in this condition.148
2.3. Condition 4: Recipients in the lab paired with absent dictators.149
A total of 27 students at the University of Granada were recruited by150
standard procedures in May 2008. When subjects arrived at the lab they151
found the experimental instructions and envelopes containing the donations152
of dictators of a previous experiment [55]. Again, subjects were asked to153
guess the donation contained in the envelope using the same scoring rule as154
in Conditions 1 and 2. Recipients received this amount in addition to the155
dictator’s donation in the envelope. Data from this condition differs from156
previously collected data in that dictators were absent when recipients made157
their prediction (i.e., recipients did not see any dictator in the room, nor did158
they receive any information about them).159
2.4. Condition 5: External observers guessing dictators’ donations.160
One week after the experimental sessions ran in the LINEEX (see Condi-161
tions 1 and 2) 50 new subjects were recruited. They received the instructions162
of the game (read aloud) in Condition 1 and were asked to predict dictators’163
behavior, that is, donations to recipients in the experiment one week before.164
Participants were asked to guess the amount donated by a randomly selected165
dictator. They were not told that they would receive any donation from these166
dictators. In line with all previous conditions, subjects were given incentives167
to make accurate guesses. The same scoring rule was used as before (5 Euros168
for a correct guess, 1 Euros if they failed by just 1 unit and 0 otherwise).169
The observations for this condition correspond to external observers. As in170
the case of Condition 2, this should allow us to explore the role played by171
involvement in the outcome.172
2.5. Condition 6: Dictators guessing the donation of other dictators.173
Dictators in Condition 1 (n6 = 50) were invited to make a second decision174
after dividing the pie. They had to predict what another dictator in the same175
area had donated to his or her corresponding recipient. Again, we use the176
same scoring rule with monetary incentives (5 Euros if they are perfectly177
accurate, 1 Euro if they fail by one and zero otherwise) to motivate dictators178
to make accurate guesses. Dictators received this amount in addition to that179
which they decided to keep in the DG.180
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2.6. General comments for all conditions.181
Recipients in Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 were rewarded for their guesses, and182
received this amount in addition to the donation of their matched dictator.183
Although there is not much evidence for hedging strategies [39], recipients184
may have incentives to hedge in these conditions (for different methods and185
problems to elicit beliefs see [56, 54]). Clearly, hedging is not possible in Con-186
ditions 5 or 6. It was decided not to use a payment scheme to avoid hedging187
(e.g., paying recipients only once -i.e., either the dictator’s donation or one188
of their guesses) because it would imply deception against the dictator (who189
made a donation thinking that a recipient would receive the money). It was190
important that dictators make their decision about donations without being191
aware of the intention to elicit beliefs in the second stage. Along these lines,192
a noteworthy aspect of the experimental design used in this study is that dic-193
tators made their decision as to how to divide the surplus without knowing194
that recipients in the experiment would make guesses about donations, thus195
avoiding any strategic giving. It was deliberately decided to elicit dictators’196
beliefs after they made their donation to eliminate any focusing influence.197
As mentioned above, previous research [35] found that asking subjects about198
others’ behavior before playing the DG triggers pro-social behavior, even199
when subjects do not think that others are generous.200
The critical difference between Conditions 1 and 2 is that the recipient201
should feel less involved in the latter. Since they are not guessing the money202
they are going to receive but the donation to a third person, less wishful203
thinking is expected. Using Conditions 1 and 2, we can therefore see if204
recipients overestimate (or underestimate) the amount of money they are205
going to receive compared with what they believe other recipients will get.206
We can see if the fact of being involved in the outcome has some effect207
on expected generosity, as it is the case when dictators make donations for208
themselves or for others [57, 58].209
The intention of Condition 3 is to assess the importance of the lab effect210
on expected generosity. Another interesting feature of this condition, apart211
from introducing high stakes, is that recipients received the instructions once212
dictators left the room. This is not the case with previous conditions, under213
which instructions are read aloud in front of dictators and recipients (i.e.,214
in Conditions 1 and 2 some credibility issues are minimized). This issue is215
further explored under Condition 4, where recipients guess the donation of216
an absent dictator. It is important to emphasize that while wishful thinking217
remains intact in Condition 4 - since the subjects are recipients of the money-218
7
the social distance is maximized [59] since the dictators who did the job were219
absent when recipients made their guesses. Interestingly, Condition 5 can220
be interpreted as an extreme variation of Condition 4. In both cases, the221
dictator is absent but, on top of that, subjects who make their guesses are222
not going to receive the dictator’s donation in Condition 5. Any wishful223
thinking is therefore eliminated. Note that hedging is not possible in this224
condition. Finally, Condition 6 provides us with new evidence: since these225
participants were dictators themselves and had already divided the pie, they226
may have felt that they had some property rights (i.e., ”owing” the game”)227
and therefore might be more likely to predict selfish behavior. Because they228
were not receiving any donation, apart from what they decided to keep,229
dictators should not have suffered any wishful thinking either.230
3. Results231
The main result of our study is that nobody expect selfish behavior and232
the modal prediction is the hyper-fair outcome; i.e., the equal split. Fig.233
1, aggregate results for all six conditions studied, and in Fig. 2 shows the234
distribution of guesses for each condition along with the mean and median235
expectation in each condition. It is very clear from the plots that, both236
in the aggregate and across conditions, subjects expect not only generosity237
(meaning positive donations), but large positive donations close to hyper-238
fair behavior from dictators, and that the distribution of guesses is roughly239
the same in all cases. It is remarkable that the largest fraction of subjects240
expect the equal split. Interestingly, a significant fraction of subjects expect241
a donation of 4, which is the median in all the conditions except Condition 5242
(observer guessing a previous donation). Overall, 60% expect to a donation243
of 4 or more, which is a large majority. As regards strictly selfish behavior,244
we observe that it is predicted by roughly 10% - 15% of subjects, with the245
exception of condition 2, where the recipient has to make a prediction about246
another dictator: in this condition, none of our subjects predicted 0. On247
the other hand, subjects seldom predict donations above the equal split.248
However, in every condition -except condition 1, guessing what one is going249
to receive— there is at least one subject who predicts full donation.250
When we look at the factors that may affect expectations, the Kruskal-251
Wallis test cannot reject the null hypothesis that all guesses come from the252
same distribution at any common significance level (χ25 = 7.30, p-value =253
0.199). The Kruskal-Wallis test has been carried out assuming that guesses254
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Figure 1: Distribution of guesses aggregated over all experimental conditions
(255 observations): Subjects seldom predicts selfishness (in blue). The modal
expectation (in orange) is hyper-fair behavior, i.e., an equal split of the pot. A
total of 25 guesses (10%) correspond to selfish behavior while 87 guesses (34%)
correspond to the equal split.
from C1 and C2 are unpaired. The Kruskal-Wallis test excluding C1 or C2255
provides the same results (p-values = 0.173 and 0.287, respectively). Pairwise256
comparisons are performed using the Mann-Whitney test to see if differences257
are significant across conditions (however the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for258
paired samples is used to compare Condition 1 and 2) (see the Supplemen-259
tary Material). The results suggest that there is no statistically significant260
difference between the underlying distributions of any two conditions at any261
common significance level (p > 0.305).262
An econometric analysis confirms that generous behavior is expected re-263
gardless of the location, the degree of involvement in the outcome, the social264
distance or the size of the stakes. Table 2 reports the estimates of four differ-265
ent specifications that attempt to predict what subjects expect that dictators266
will donate. These specifications are frequently used to model the dictator’s267
behavior [25]. We first considered an OLS regression, but because donations268
cannot be smaller than 0 or larger than 10 (cf. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), one may269
argue that the data are censored. In that case, we included a Tobit model270
as it may be more appropriate. Subsequently, we studied a hurdle model,271
that also accounts for the “spike” in the zero donation, but assumes that the272
forces affecting the willingness to guess a positive donation may differ from273
the ones that determine what subjects expect dictators to donate. Such a274
hurdle specification therefore assumes that subjects have to decide whether275
to guess any donation at all with a logit model (Hurdle0), and only then the276
process determining the positive guessing applies (Hurdle+). In line with277
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Figure 2: Distribution of guesses across treatments: Hyper-fair behavior (50-50)
is the modal expectation (in orange) across treatments; pure selfish behavior (in
blue) is barely predicted. There are no significant differences across treatments.
our discussion so far, guesses are found to be consistent across conditions, as278
none of the dummy variables are significantly different from zero. As can be279
seen from the Table 2, for OLS and Tobit models, the value of the constant280
is significantly different from zero, which indicates that subjects expect a281
positive donation from the dictator. The negative (and significant) value of282
the constant in Hurdle0 can be interpreted as subjects not being likely to283
predict the zero donation.284
Next, we analyze the accuracy of expectations by comparing the elicited285
beliefs with the actual donation of dictators. Fig. 3 presents our data us-286
ing the cumulative distribution of guesses and donations in each condition.287
Subjects turn out to be quite accurate in their predictions in Conditions 1,288
2, 5 and 6, where we find no significant difference between the expected be-289
havior and actual donations (p > 0.130). In the presence of high incentives290
(condition 3) or when dictators are absent (condition 4), recipients tend to291
overestimate the amount they are going to receive from dictators (p < 0.01),292
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Figure 3: Expectations and observed behavior across treatments: Cumulative
distribution of guesses (red lines) and dictators’ donations (blue lines) in each
condition. Expectations are very accurate, in particular in conditions 1, 2, 5 and
6.
albeit with some discrepancy. As we have discussed above, as expectations293
are the same in all conditions, these disagreements must arise from the fact294
that dictators are indeed more selfish in these two conditions (see the Sup-295
plementary Material). Not surprisingly, dictators in a high stakes have296
been found to donate relatively less [25, 26, 38]. Identical selfish behavior297
has been observed in experiments with no direct contact between dictators298
and recipients – socially far [27, 28] – where dictators might even belief that299
the money is not going to reach the recipient [29].300
Finally, we look into the relationship between a subject’s behavior and her301
own expectation. Our data from condition 6 (where dictators’ expectations302
about others’ donations were elicited) provide us with the results depicted in303
Fig. 4. We observe a clear correlation between the dictators’ donations and304
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Figure 4: Within-subjects analysis of expections and own behavior (Condition
6): Experimental subjects’ behavior is correlated with their expectations about
others’s donations. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of subjects
with a given belief and behavior.
their beliefs about how other dictators would behave (r2 = 0.28, p = 0.046;305
when restricted to positive donations only, r2 = 0.40, p = 0.005). The fact306
that the majority of dictators donated an amount equal to their belief high-307
lights the deep connection between expectations and behavior [34, 35, 36].308
On the other hand, only a minority of subjects donate more (less) than their309
own expectation, as can be observed from the fact that there are very few cir-310
cles below (above) the diagonal in Fig. 4, an indication that expectations are311
indeed anchoring the subjects’ choices for donations. Our setup does not al-312
low us to control for order effects, but it has been experimentally shown that313
eliciting expectations before playing the DG promotes pro-social behavior314
[35].315
4. Discussion316
In summary, our series of experiments strongly supports the conclusion317
that subjects expect generous behavior in situations, such as those modeled318
by the DG, where self-interest should be the rule. Our findings are derived in319
one-shot games, i.e., in the absence of any expectations of reciprocity. This320
is a clear indication that humans expect other humans to behave socially.321
Importantly, expectations are well connected to the degree of generosity and322
are not affected by the degree of involvement, the social distance, the possi-323
bility of hedging, the size of the stake or the location of the experiment. We324
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stress that this result is obtained in one-shot games, i.e., in the absence of325
any hope of reciprocity.326
We believe that our results are related to the experimental evidence show-327
ing that cooperation might be the default option for a large fraction of the328
population [40, 41, 42]. Indeed, in one-shot or in the first round of iterated329
Prisoner’s Dilemma or Public Good games approximately half of the sub-330
jects cooperate [43]. Remarkably, the fraction of people is very similar to the331
fraction of subjects expecting hyper-fair offers in our experiments. There is332
evidence that cooperative choices are correlated with generosity [44, 45]. We333
have seen that expectations about generosity are also correlated with gener-334
ous behaviour, what might indicate a common prosocial motivation towards335
cooperation.336
The findings we have reported suggest an important direction for fu-337
ture work, namely whether expectations in one game (or strategic situation,338
generally speaking) carry over to a different one. Recent experiments by339
Peysakhovich et al. [46] suggest a sizable fraction of the population may340
exhibit a ’cooperative phenotype’, leading them to make prosocial decisions341
across games. Studying the relationship between expectations and these342
phenotypes is likely to lead to a breakthrough in the understanding of coop-343
eration and, above all, in providing solid indications as to how to promote344
prosocial behavior.345
From a broader perspective, the so-called Neo-Darwinian theory[47] sug-346
gests that altruism may be detrimental as it reduces the one’s fitness of one347
while enhancing the fitness of others. Arguably, altruism may have positive348
effects from an evolutionary viewpoint, as human beings are characterized by349
bounded rationality and may learn from other individuals what is good for350
them [48, 49]. While there might be different mechanisms to sustain altruism351
and cooperative behaviour (e.g., punishment [20, 50, 51]), all the evidence352
presented here points to expectations as another important factor driving353
altruism and social norms. Fair behavior might be well-internalized and thus354
becomes the de facto rule, which is then reflected in subject expectations and355
leads to generous behavior. Key for this mechanism to work is the accuracy356
of the beliefs held, as we have seen we are able as a society to have a clear idea357
of what to expect from others. Recent findings highlight that subjects keep358
believing in prosocial behaviour in repeated contexts, even when cooperation359
effectively decreases [52]. Further research on the connection between expec-360
tations and own behavior, on the existence and characteristic of cooperative361
phenotypes, and on the accuracy of expectations is needed to shed light on362
13
these issues.363
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Table 1: Summary of questions addressed in this study and the corresponding experimen-
tal conditions. Note: Subjects have to guess the dictator’s donation in the DG. Across
conditions, we vary the degree of involvement, the social distance, the role of the guesser,
the possibility of hedging, the size of the stake or the location of the experiment. We
can therefore assess how these features affect expectations about generosity in one-shot
interaction with strangers.
Question Condition
1 Do experimental subjects in
the lab expect selfish behav-
ior?
Recipient guessing the donation she is
going to receive in a lab experiment
2 Do experimental subjects in
the lab expect selfish behavior
when they are not involved in
the outcome?
Recipient guessing the donation other
recipient is going to receive in a lab
experiment
3 Do experimental subjects (in
the field) expect selfish be-
havior in the presence of high
stakes?
Recipient guessing the donation she is
going to receive in a field experiment
with high incentives
4 Do experimental subjects in
the lab expect selfish behavior
when dictators are absent?
Recipient guessing the donation she is
going to receive from an absent dicta-
tor
5 Do experimental subjects in
the lab expect selfish behavior
when they are just observers?
A third party (observer) guessing the
donation that a recipient has received
in a previous experiment
6 Do experimental subjects in
the lab expect selfish behav-
ior after they divided the pie?
A dictator guessing the donation of
other dictator
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Table 2: Econometric results for guesses about the dictator’s donation. Note: Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The hurdle model considers 205 observations because
recipients never predict that other dictators will donate zero; i.e., Condition 2 is not taken
into account in the analysis. Hurdle+ relies on the 230 observations that correspond to
positive guesses. Significance at the *5%, **1% level. We observe that subjects expect for
dictators to donate a positive amount. There are no differences across conditions therefore
the degree of involvement, the social distance, the role of the stakes do not influence the
degree of expected generosity
OLS Tobit Hurdle0 Hurdle+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C2 (Other dictators) 0.620 0.717 0.102
(0.41) (0.44) (0.42)
C3 (Field) 0.743 0.747 0.077 0.355
(0.48) (0.53) (0.77) (0.50)
C4 (Absent dictator) 0.526 0.489 0.448 0.342
(0.49) (0.53) (0.72) (0.52)
C5 (Observer) -0.300 -0.368 0.539 -0.037
(0.41) (0.45) (0.61) (0.44)
C6 (Dictator) 0.320 0.325 0.000 0.149
(0.29) (0.31) (0.47) (0.31)
Constant 3.400** 3.303 -2.197** -0.499
(0.289) (0.315) (0.471) (0.307)
n 255 255 205 230
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